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Abstract
We investigate coin-flipping protocols for multiple parties
in a quantum broadcast setting:
• We propose and motivate a definition for quantum
broadcast. Our model of quantum broadcast channel
is new.
• We discovered that quantum broadcast is essentially
a combination of pairwise quantum channels and a
classical broadcast channel. This is a somewhat sur-
prising conclusion, but helps us in both our lower and
upper bounds.
• We provide tight upper and lower bounds on the opti-
mal bias ε of a coin which can be flipped by k par-
ties of which exactly g parties are honest: for any
1 ≤ g ≤ k, ε = 1
2
−Θ ( gk ).
Thus, as long as a constant fraction of the players are hon-
est, they can prevent the coin from being fixed with at least
a constant probability. This result stands in sharp contrast
with the classical setting, where no non-trivial coin-flipping
is possible when g ≤ k
2
.
1. Introduction
1.1. The problem
Consider k parties out of which at least g ≥ 1 are honest
and at most (k−g) are dishonest; which players are dishon-
est is fixed in advance but unknown to the honest players.
The players can communicate over broadcast channels. Ini-
tially they do not share randomness, but they can privately
flip coins; the probabilities below are with respect to the
private random coins. A coin-flipping protocol establishes
among the honest players a bit b such that
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• if all players are honest, Pr[b = 0] = Pr[b = 1] = 1
2
• if at least g players are honest, then Pr[b = 0],Pr[b =
1] ≤ 1
2
+ ε
ε is called the bias; a small bias implies that colluding dis-
honest players cannot strongly influence the outcome of the
protocol. Players may abort the protocol.
1.2. Related work
Classically, if a (weak) majority of the players is bad
then no bias < 1
2
can be achieved and hence no mean-
ingful protocols exist [16]. For example, if we only have
two players and one of them is dishonest, then no proto-
cols with bias < 1
2
exist. For a minority of bad players,
quite non-trivial protocols exist. For example, Feige [8] el-
egantly showed that (1
2
+ δ)-fraction of good players can
achieve bias 1
2
− Ω(δ1.65), while achieving bias better than
1
2
− δ is impossible.
Allowing quantum bits (qubits) to be sent instead of
classical bits changes the situation dramatically. Surpris-
ingly, already in the two-party case coin flipping with bias
< 1
2
is possible, as was first shown by Aharonov et al. [2].
The best known bias is 1
4
and this is optimal for a special
class of three-round protocols [4]; for a bias of ε at least
Ω(log log 1ε ) rounds of communication are necessary [4].
Kitaev (unpublished, see [12]) showed that in the two-party
case no bias smaller than 1√
2
− 1
2
is possible.
A weak version of the coin-flipping problem is one in
which we know in advance that outcome 0 benefits Alice
and outcome 1 benefits Bob. In this case, we only need to
bound the probabilities of a dishonest Alice convincing Bob
that the outcome is 0 and a dishonest Bob convincing Alice
that the outcome is 1. In the classical setting, a standard ar-
gument shows that even weak coin flipping with a bias < 1
2
is impossible when a majority of the players is dishonest.
In the quantum setting, this scenario was first studied under
the name quantum gambling [9]. Subsequently, Spekkens
and Rudolph [17] gave a quantum protocol for weak coin
flipping with bias 1√
2
− 1
2
(i.e., no party can achieve the de-
sired outcome with probability greater than 1√
2
). This was
recently improved to 0.192 by Mochon [14]. Notice that this
is a better bias than in the best strong coin flipping protocol
of [4].
We also remark that Kitaev’s lower bound for strong
coin flipping does not apply to weak coin flipping. Indeed,
Mochon’s protocol has a better bound than Kitaev’s lower
bound. Thus, weak protocols with arbitrarily small ε > 0
may be possible. The only known lower bounds for weak
coin flipping are that the protocol of [17] is optimal for a re-
stricted class of protocols [3] and that a protocol must use at
least Ω(log log 1ε ) rounds of communication to achieve bias
ε (shown in [4] for strong coin flipping but the proof also
applies to weak coin flipping).
1.3. Our contribution
In this paper, we focus on quantum coin flipping for more
than two players. However, for our multiparty quantum pro-
tocols we will first need a new two-party quantum protocol
for coin flipping with penalty for cheating. In this problem,
players can be heavily penalized for cheating, which will al-
low us to achieve lower cheating probability as a function
of the penalty. This primitive and the quantum protocol for
it are presented in Section 2; they may be of independent in-
terest.
One way to classically model communication between
more than two parties is by a primitive called broadcast.
When a player sends a bit to the other players he broad-
casts it to all the players at once [6]. However, when we
deal with qubits such a broadcast channel is not possible
since it requires to clone or copy the qubit to be broadcast
and cloning a qubit is not possible [19]. In Section 3 we de-
velop a proper quantum version of the broadcast primitive,
which generalizes the classical broadcast. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, we show that our quantum broadcast channel is
essentially as powerful as a combination of pairwise quan-
tum channels and a classical broadcast channel. This could
also be of independent interest.
Using this broadcast primitive we obtain our main result:
Theorem 1 For k parties out of which g are honest, the op-
timal achievable bias is (1
2
−Θ( gk )).
We prove Theorem 1 by giving an efficient protocol with
bias (1
2
− Ω( gk )) in Section 4 and showing a lower bound
of (1
2
− O( gk )) in Section 5. Our protocol builds upon our
two-party coin-flipping with penalties which we develop in
Section 2, and the classical protocol of Feige [8] which al-
lows to reduce the number of participants in the protocol
without significantly changing the fraction of good players
present. Our lower bound extends the lower bound of Ki-
taev [12].
To summarize, we show that quantum coin flipping is
significantly more powerful than classical coin flipping.
Moreover, we give tight tradeoffs between the number of
cheaters tolerated and the bias of the resulting coin achiev-
able by quantum coin-flipping protocols. We also remark
that the fact that we obtain tight bounds in the quantum
setting is somewhat surprising. For comparison, such tight
bounds are unknown for the classical setting.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume some famil-
iarity with quantum computing. We recommend the book
of Nielsen and Chuang [15] for background information on
this topic.
1.4. Semidefinite programming
Some of our proofs make use of duality in semidefinite
programming. For a review of semidefinite programming,
see e.g., [13]. Semidefinite programming is a generaliza-
tion of linear programming. In addition to linear constraints,
semidefinite programs (SDPs) may have constraints that re-
quire that a square matrix of variables is positive semi-
definite, i.e., that is is symmetric and all its eigenvalues are
nonnegative.
We make use of the following basic properties of semi-
definite matrices. Let A, B, and C denote square matrices
acting on some linear space V and W ⊆ V a subspace.
If A is positive semidefinite, we write A ≥ 0. We define
A ≥ B :⇔ A−B ≥ 0. Then
A ≥ B ⇔ ∀|ψ〉 : 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ|B|ψ〉
A = B + C and C ≥ 0⇒ A ≥ B
A ≥ B ⇒ trW(A) ≥ trW(B)
Here trW(A) denotes the partial trace.
In the Lagrange-multiplier approach, a constrained opti-
mization problem (called the primal problem)
max
x≥0
f(x) subject to g(x) ≤ a for fixed a > 0
is reformulated as an unconstrained optimization problem
max
x
inf
λ≥0
f(x)− λ · (g(x)− a) ,
which is bounded from above by the constrained optimiza-
tion problem (the dual problem)
min
λ≥0
λ · a subject to (f − λ · g)(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ 0 .
In linear programming, (f − λ · g)(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ 0 if
and only if f −λ ·g ≤ 0. Therefore the preceding optimiza-
tion problem can be simplified to
min
λ≥0
λ · a subject to f − λ · g ≤ 0 .
The same construction applies to SDPs using matrices as
variables and A · B := tr(A∗B). A feasible solution of the
dual yields an upper bound on the optimal value of the pri-
mal problem. Strong duality (i.e., that the optimal values co-
incide) does not hold in general; however, we will not need
this below.
2. Two-party coin flipping with penalty for
cheating
We consider the following model for coin flipping. We
have two parties: Alice and Bob, among whom at least one
is assumed to be honest. If no party is caught cheating, the
winner gets 1 coin, the loser gets 0 coins. If honest Alice
catches dishonest Bob, Bob loses v coins but Alice wins 0
coins. Similarly, if honest Bob catches dishonest Alice, she
loses v coins but Bob wins 0 coins.
Theorem 2 If Alice (Bob) is honest, the expected win by
dishonest Bob (Alice) is at most 1
2
+ 1√
v
, for v ≥ 4.
Proof. The protocol is as follows. Let δ = 2√
v
. For a ∈
{0, 1}, define |ψa〉 =
√
δ|a〉|a〉+√1− δ|2〉|2〉 ∈ C3⊗C3.
1. Alice picks a ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, generates
the state |ψa〉 and sends the second register to Bob.
2. Bob stores this state in a quantum memory, picks b ∈
{0, 1} uniformly at random and sends b to Alice.
3. Alice then sends a and the first register to Bob and Bob
verifies if the joint state of the two registers is |ψa〉 by
measuring it in a basis consisting of |ψa〉 and every-
thing orthogonal to it. If the test is passed, the result of
coin flip is a ⊕ b, otherwise Bob catches Alice cheat-
ing.
Theorem 2 follows immediately from the following two
lemmas. ✷
Lemma 3 Bob cannot win with probability more than 1
2
+
1√
v
, thus his expected win is at most 1
2
+ 1√
v
.
Proof. Let ρa be the density matrix of the second register
of |ψa〉. Then, for the trace distance between ρ0 and ρ1 we
have ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖t = 2δ.
The trace distance is a measure for the distinguishability
of quantum states analogous to the total-variation distance
of probability distributions; see e.g., [1]. In particular, the
probability of Bob winning is at most 1
2
+ ‖ρ0−ρ1‖t
4
= 1
2
+
δ
2
= 1
2
+ 1√
v
. ✷
Lemma 4 Dishonest Alice’s expected win is at most 1
2
+
1√
v
.
Proof. Alice is trying to achieve a⊕ b = 0, which is equiv-
alent to a = b. We describe the optimal strategy of Alice as
a semidefinite program.
The variables are semidefinite matrices over subspaces
of X ⊗A⊗B, where X is Alice’s private storage,A ∼= C3
holds the first qutrit of the state to be sent in the protocol
and B ∼= C3 holds the second qutrit. For a, b ∈ {0, 1}, let
ρba ∈ A⊗B denote the state that Bob has in the last round,
when he has sent b and Alice has sent a (and some qutrit).
For b ∈ {0, 1}, let ρb ∈ X ⊗ A ⊗ B denote the state be-
fore Alice decides on a. Finally, let ρinitial ∈ X ⊗A⊗B de-
note the state that Alice prepares initially and of which she
sends the B part to Bob.
Then we have the following constraints. The initial state
is an arbitrary density matrix:
tr(ρinitial) = 1 (1)
When Alice learns b, she cannot touch B anymore, but she
can apply an arbitrary unitary Ub on X ⊗ A to store her
choice a in X and to prepare the A register in the desired
state:
trXA(ρinitial) = trXA(ρb) for all b ∈ {0, 1} (2)
She will then measureX register in the computational basis
to obtain a. Therefore we have
trX (ρb) = ρb0 + ρb1 for all b ∈ {0, 1} . (3)
Note that this implies tr(ρb0) + tr(ρb1) = 1, so that in gen-
eral the ρba are not density matrices.
Now Bob checks ρba. This gives rise to the following ob-
jective function for Alice’s optimal cheating strategy:
max
∑
β∈{0,1}
∑
α∈{0,1}
Pr[b = β] Pr[a = α|b = β]·
(
δαβ Pr[ρβα passes]− vPr[ρβα fails]
) (4)
Here the Kronecker-Delta δαβ = 1 if and only if α = β
measures whether Alice managed to get a and b to match.
Maximizing (4) is equivalent to maximizing
max
∑
β∈{0,1}
∑
α∈{0,1}
Pr[b = β] Pr[a = α|b = β]·
Pr[ρβα passes] (δαβ + v) . (5)
Bob plays honestly, therefore Pr[b = 0] = Pr[b = 1] = 1
2
.
Moreover, Pr[a = α|b = β] = tr(ρβ,α) and
Pr[ρβα passes] = tr
(
|ψα〉〈ψα| ρβ,α
tr(ρβ,α)
)
.
Hence, Pr[a = α|b = β] Pr[ρβα passes] = 〈ψα|ρβα|ψα〉.
Substituting this into (5) and discarding the constant factor
1
2
gives the final objective function
max
∑
β∈{0,1}
∑
α∈{0,1}
〈ψα|ρβα|ψα〉 (δαβ + v) . (6)
We now proceed to constructing the dual of the SDP formed
by the objective function (6) together with the constraints
(1), (2), and (3). The Lagrange ansatz is
max
P
inf
D
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
tr ((δab + v)|ψa〉〈ψa|ρba)
+
∑
b∈{0,1}
tr (Lb (trX (ρb)− ρb0 − ρb1))
−
∑
b∈{0,1}
tr (Mb trXA(ρb − ρinitial))
− tr(λ(ρinitial − 1)) (7)
where P are the primal variables as before, i.e.,
P = {(ρinitial, ρ0, ρ1, ρ00, ρ01, ρ10, ρ11) :
ρinitial, ρ0, ρ1 ∈ S(X ⊗A⊗ B),
ρ00, ρ01, ρ10, ρ11 ∈ S(A⊗ B)}
and the dual variables (Lagrange multipliers) are
D = {(L0, L1,M0,M1, λ) :
L0, L1 ∈ H(A⊗ B),M0,M1 ∈ H(B), λ ∈ R} .
HereH(V) and S(V) denote the Hermitian and semidefinite
matrices, respectively, operating on the linear space V . Col-
lecting the primal variables in (7), we get for ρinitial
tr ((M0 +M1 − λ1B) ρinitial) .
For ρb, b ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain
tr ((Lb − (1A ⊗Mb)) trX (ρb)) .
For ρba, a, b ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain
tr ((−Lb + (δab + v)|ψa〉〈ψa|) ρba) .
The terms in (7) not involving primal variables are just λ.
Hence, the following dual SDP will give an upper bound on
the optimal value of our primal SDP:
minimize λ subject to (8)
M0 +M1 ≤ λ1B (9)
Lb ≤ 1A ⊗Mb for all b ∈ {0, 1} (10)
(v + δab)|ψa〉〈ψa| ≤ Lb for all a, b ∈ {0, 1} (11)
(L0, L1,M0,M1, λ) ∈ D (12)
We now construct a feasible solution for the dual SDP. We
restrict our attention to M0 and M1 of the form
M0 =

m0 m1
m2

 and M1 =

m1 m0
m2


for some m0, m1, m2 ∈ R with
m0 ≥ 0 , m1 ≥ 0 , m2 = 1
2
(m0 +m1) . (13)
Moreover, we also impose the restriction Lb = 1A ⊗Mb
for b ∈ {0, 1}. Since then λ ≥ m0 +m1, our goal reduces
to minimizing m0 and m1 subject to
L0 − (v + 1)|ψ0〉〈ψ0| ≥ 0 (14)
L0 − v|ψ1〉〈ψ1| ≥ 0 (15)
L1 − v|ψ0〉〈ψ0| ≥ 0 (16)
L1 − (v + 1)|ψ1〉〈ψ1| ≥ 0 . (17)
Constraints (14) and (17) are satisfied if
m0 ≥ (v + 1)δ (18)
m2 ≥ (v + 1)(1− δ) (19)
m0m2 ≥ (v + 1)(1− δ)m0 + (v + 1)δm2 . (20)
Similarly, Constraints (15) and (16) require that
m1 ≥ vδ (21)
m2 ≥ v(1 − δ) (22)
m1m2 ≥ v(1 − δ)m1 + vδm2 . (23)
A solution to the system (13),(18)-(23) is
m0 =
1
2
(1 + v)
(
2− δ(1 + 2v)
+
√
4− 4δ + (δ + 2δv)2
)
m1 =
1
2
v
(
2 + δ + 2δv −
√
4− 4δ + (δ + 2δv)2
)
.
From this and the definition of δ, we get that there is feasi-
ble solution of the dual SDP with
λ = m0 +m1
= 2v +
−1 +√v − 2v +
√
1− 2√v + 5v + 4v2√
v
≤ 2v + 1 + 1
4
√
v
.
From the earlier transformations of the primal objective
function, it follows that the optimal expected payoff of Al-
ice is bounded from above by 1
2
λ− v ≤ 1
2
+ 1
8
√
v
. ✷
3. The multiparty model
3.1. Adversaries
In this work, we assume computationally unbounded ad-
versaries. However, they have to obey quantum mechan-
ics and cannot read the private memory of the honest play-
ers (but they can communicate secretly with each other).
Moreover, we assume that they can only access the mes-
sage space in between rounds or when according to the pro-
tocol it is their turn to send a message.
3.2. The broadcast channel
A classical broadcast channel allows one party to send
a classical bit to all the other players. In the quantum set-
ting this would mean that a qubit would be sent to all the
other players. However, when there are more than two play-
ers in total we would have to clone or copy the qubit in or-
der to send it to the other players. Even if the sender knows
a classical preparation of the state he wants to send, we can-
not allow him to prepare copies because he may be a cheater
and send different states to different parties. It is well known
that it is impossible to clone a qubit [19], because cloning
is not a unitary operation. This means that we will have to
take a slightly different approach. Quantum broadcast chan-
nels have been studied in an information-theoretic context
before [5, 18] but not in the presence of faulty or malicious
parties.
Our quantum broadcast channel works as follows. Sup-
pose there are k players in total and that one player wants
to broadcast a qubit that is in the state α|0〉 + β|1〉. What
will happen is that the channel will create the k-qubit state
α|0k〉 + β|1k〉 and send one of the k qubits to each of the
other players. The state α|0k〉+ β|1k〉 can be easily created
from α|0〉 + β|1〉 by taking k − 1 fresh qubits in the state
|0k−1〉. This joint state can be written as α|0k〉+ β|10k−1〉.
Next we flip the last k − 1 bits conditional on the first bit
being a 1, thus obtaining the desired state α|0k〉 + β|1k〉.
This last operation can be implemented with a series of
controlled-not operations. Note that this state is not produc-
ing k copies of the original state, which would be the k-fold
product state (α|0〉+ β|1〉)⊗ . . .⊗ (α|0〉+ β|1〉).
Theorem 5 In the following sense, a quantum broadcast
channel between k parties is comparable to models where
the parties have a classical broadcast channel and/or pair-
wise quantum channels:
• If all parties are honest:
1. One use of the quantum broadcast channel can
be simulated with 2(k−1) uses of pairwise quan-
tum channels.
2. One use of a classical broadcast channel can be
simulated with one use of the quantum broadcast
channel.
3. One use of a pairwise quantum channel can be
simulated by k+1 uses of the quantum broadcast
channel.
• If all but one of the parties are dishonest, using one
of the simulations above in place of the original com-
munication primitive does not confer extra cheating
power.
Proof. We first give the simulations and argue that they
work in case all players are honest.
1. The sender takes k−1 fresh qubits in state |0k〉. He ap-
plies k − 1 times CNOT where the subsystem to be
broadcast is the control of the CNOT and the fresh
qubits are the destination. He then sends each of the
k − 1 qubits via the pairwise quantum channels to the
k − 1 other parties. Each recipient j flips a (private)
classical random bit rj and if rj = 1 performs a σz
phase flip on the received qubit. Here σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
is the Pauli matrix that multiplies the relative phase be-
tween the |0〉 and the |1〉 state by −1. He then sends rj
back to the sender. The sender computes the parity of
the rj and if it is odd, he performs a σz phase flip on
his part of the broadcast state, thus restoring the cor-
rect relative phase. (This randomization is a counter-
measure; its utility is explained below.)
2. When the sender wants to broadcast bit b ∈ {0, 1}, he
uses the quantum broadcast channel on qubit |b〉. The
recipients immediately measure their qubit in the com-
putational basis to obtain the classical bit.
3. The quantum broadcast channel can be used to create
an EPR pair 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) between two players Pi
and Pj with the assistance of the other (k− 2) players.
i and j are determined by the protocol.
First one player broadcasts the state 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
resulting in the k qubit state |ϕ〉 = 1√
2
(|0k〉 + |1k〉).
Now one after the other, the k − 2 remaining play-
ers perform a Hadamard transformation on their qubit,
measure it in the computational basis, and broadcast
the classical result. Next, if Pi receives a 1 he applies
a phase flip σz to his part of |ϕ〉 (Pj does nothing). Af-
ter this operation, |ϕ〉 will be an EPR state between Pi
and Pj unentangled with the other k − 2 parties. Us-
ing a shared EPR pair, a protocol called teleportation
[7] can be used to simulate a private quantum channel
between Pi and Pj . Teleportation requires the trans-
mission of two bits of classical information.
For the case of all but one party being dishonest:
1. If the sender is honest, the recipients obtain exactly the
same subsystems as for the quantum broadcast chan-
nel.
If one of the recipients is honest, he may receive
an arbitrary quantum subsystem up to the random-
ized relative phase. However, exactly the same can be
achieved with a quantum broadcast channel with k− 1
cheating parties, who each perform a Hadamard trans-
formation on their subsystem followed by a measure-
ment in the computational basis.
2. If the sender is honest, all recipients obtain the same
computational-basis state.
If one of the recipients is honest, he obtains a classi-
cal bit that is possibly randomized in case the dishon-
est sender does not broadcast a basis state. Since the
sender can flip a coin himself, this does not give more
cheating power.
3. If the sender is honest, we can assume without loss
of generality that all cheating action is done after the
EPR pair has been established, because the (merged)
cheaters can easily recreate the original broadcast state
and also compensate any phase flipping of the hon-
est sender. However, after the EPR pair has been es-
tablished, the sender unilaterally performs his part of
the teleportation circuit and measurements and sends
the two bits of classical information. So the most gen-
eral cheating action is to apply a quantum operation af-
ter the reception of the two classical bits. Furthermore,
we can even assume that the cheating action is done af-
ter the correction circuit of teleportation (this is similar
to the teleportation of quantum gates [10]) and, hence,
amounts to cheating on a pairwise quantum channel.
If one of the recipients is honest, the best the
cheaters can aim for is to give an arbitrary quan-
tum state to the honest recipient. This they can also
achieve over a pairwise quantum channel.
✷
4. Multiparty quantum protocols
We will first consider the case of only one good player
(i.e., g = 1) among k players and later extend our results to
general g.
One honest player. We need to construct a protocol with
bias 1
2
− Ω( 1k ). Before proceeding to our actual protocol,
let us consider a simple protocol which trivially extends the
previous work in the two-party setting, but does not give us
the desired result. The protocols is as follows: player 1 flips
a random coin with player 2, player 3 flips a random coin
with player 4 and so forth. In each pair, the player with the
higher id wins if the coin is 1 and the one with the lower
id if the coin is 0. The winners repeat the procedure. With
each round of the tournament, half of the remaining play-
ers are eliminated (if there is an odd number of players at
any moment, the one with the highest id advances to the
next round). When there are only two players left, the coin
they flip becomes the output of the protocol. (Above we as-
sume we have private point-to-point quantum channels and
a classical broadcast channel, which is justified by Theo-
rem 5.)
The elimination step can be implemented using the weak
two-party coin-flipping protocol by Spekkens and Rudolph
[17] and the last round by the the strong two-party coin-
flipping protocol by Ambainis [4]. If there is only one good
player, the probability that he makes it to the last round is
(
1− 1√
2
)⌈−1+log k⌉
;
in this case, the probability that the bad players can deter-
mine the output coin is 3
4
. In case the good player gets elim-
inated, the bad players can completely determine the coin.
Hence, the overall probability that the bad players can de-
termine the coin is
1− 1
4
(
1− 1√
2
)⌈−1+log k⌉
≤ 1− 1
4k1.78
,
which corresponds to bias
1
2
− Ω
(
1
k1.78
)
.
Using the protocol by Mochon [14] improves the expo-
nent slightly to ≈ 1.7 but not all the way to 1. To improve
the bound above to the desired value 1
2
− Ω( 1k ), we will
use our coin-flipping protocol with penalty from Section 2.
The idea is that in normal quantum coin-flipping protocols
for two parties, there are three outcomes for a given player:
“win,” “lose,” and “abort.” Looking at the elimination tour-
nament above, if an honest player loses a given coin flip-
ping round, he does not complain and the bad player wins
the game. However, if the honest player detects cheating, he
can and will abort the entire process, which corresponds to
the failure of the dishonest players to fix the coin. Of course,
if there are few elimination rounds left, bad players might
be willing to risk the abort if they gain significant benefits
in winning the round. However, if the round number is low,
abort becomes prohibitively expensive: a dishonest player
might not be willing to risk it given there are plenty more
opportunities for the honest player to “lose normally.” Thus,
instead of regular two-party coin-flipping protocols, which
do not differentiate between losing and aborting, we can
employ our protocol for coin flipping with penalty, where
the penalties are very high at the original rounds, and even-
tually get lower towards the end of the protocol. Specific
penalties are chosen in a way which optimizes the final bias
we get, and allows us to achieve the desired bias 1
2
−Ω( 1k ).
Theorem 6 There is a strong quantum coin-flipping proto-
col for k parties with bias at most 1
2
− ck for some constant
c, even with (k − 1) bad parties.
Proof. We assume that k = 2n for some n > 0, as it
changes c by at most a constant factor. Let Qv be the max-
imum expected win in a two-party protocol with penalty v.
Consider the following protocol with n rounds numbered 1
to n.
At the beginning of round i, we have 2n+1−i parties re-
maining. We divide them into pairs. Each pair performs the
two-party coin-flipping protocol with penalty (2n−i − 1).
The party with the lower id plays Alice and wins if the out-
come is 0; the party with the higher id plays Bob and wins
if the outcome is 1. The winners proceed to round (i+ 1).
At the beginning of round (n − 2), there are just 8 par-
ties remaining. They perform three rounds of regular coin
flipping with no penalty using the protocol of [4, 11], in
which no cheater can determine the coin with probability
more than 3
4
. This results in maximum probability of 63
64
for
fixing the outcome when there is at least one good player
among the 8. The result of the last round is the result of our
2n-party protocol.
Assume that the honest player has won the first (n − j)
coin flips and advanced to round (j+1). Assume that the all
other players in round (j + 1) are dishonest. Let Pj be the
maximum probability with which (2j−1) dishonest players
can fix the outcome in this case.
Lemma 7
1− Pj ≥ (1− Pj−1)(1 −Q2j−1−1) (24)
Proof. Let pw, pl, pc be the probabilities of the honest
player winning, losing and catching the other party cheat-
ing in the round (j + 1) of the protocol. Notice that pw +
pl + pc = 1. Then, the probability Pj of 2j − 1 dishon-
est parties fixing the coin is at most pl + pwPj−1. (If the
honest player loses, they win immediately. If he wins, they
can still bias the coin in j − 1 remaining rounds to proba-
bility at most Pj−1. If he catches his opponent cheating, he
exits the protocol and the dishonest players have no more
chances to cheat him.) Using pw = 1− pl − pc, we have
Pj ≤ pl + pwPj−1 = Pj−1 + (1 − Pj−1)pl − Pj−1pc
= Pj−1 + (1− Pj−1)
(
pl − Pj−1
1− Pj−1 pc
)
(25)
Next, notice that Pj−1 ≥ 1− 12j−1 . This is because 2j−1−1
bad players could just play honestly when they face the
good player and fix the coin flip if two bad players meet
in the last round. Therefore, Pj−1
1−Pj−1 ≥ 2j−1 − 1 and (25)
becomes
Pj ≤ Pj−1 + (1 − Pj−1)(pl − (2j−1 − 1)pc)
The term pl − (2j−1 − 1)pc is at most Q2j−1−1 because
we can interpret it as the expected payoff of the cheater that
plays with the honest player. Hence,
Pj ≤ Pj−1 + (1− Pj−1)Q2j−1−1 ,
which is equivalent to the desired (24). ✷
By applying the lemma inductively, we obtain
1− Pn ≥ (1− P8)
n∏
j=4
(1−Q2j−1−1)
≥ 1
64
n∏
j=4
(1−Q2j−1−1) .
Using the bound in Theorem 2 we get
1− Pn ≥ 1
64
n−1∏
j=3
(1−Q2j−1)
≥ 1
64
n−1∏
j=3
(
1
2
− 1√
2j − 1
)
≥ 1
8 · 2n
∞∏
j=3
(
1− 2√
2j − 1
)
.
The last product is a positive constant. Therefore, for some
constant c > 0 we have 1 − Pn ≥ c2n = ck , which means
that the bias is at most 1
2
− Ω( 1k ). ✷
Extending to many honest players. We can extend Theo-
rem 6 to any number g ≥ 1 of good players by using the
classical lightest-bin protocol of Feige [8]. This protocol al-
lows us to reduce the total number of players until a sin-
gle good player is left without significantly changing the
fraction of good players, after which we can run the quan-
tum protocol of Theorem 6 to get the desired result. Specif-
ically, Lemma 8 from [8] implies that starting from g = δk
good players out of k players, the players can (classically)
select a sub-committee of O(1δ ) = O(
k
g ) players contain-
ing at least one good player with probability at least 1
2
. Now
this sub-committee can use the quantum protocol of Theo-
rem 6 to flip a coin with bias 1
2
− Ω( gk ), provided it indeed
contains at least one honest player. But since the latter hap-
pens with probability at least 1
2
, the final bias is at most
1
2
− 1
2
· Ω( gk ) = 12 − Ω( gk ), as desired.
5. Lower bound
5.1. The two-party bound
For completeness and to facilitate the presentation of
our generalization, we reproduce here Kitaev’s unpublished
proof [12] that any two-party strong quantum coin-flipping
protocol must have bias at least 1√
2
. The model here is that
the two parties communicate over a quantum channel.
Definition 8 Let H := A ⊗ M ⊗ B denote the Hilbert
space of the coin-flipping protocol composed of Alice’s pri-
vate space, the message space, and Bob’s private space. A
2N -round two-party coin-flipping protocol is a tuple
(UA,1, . . . , UA,N , UB,1, . . . , UB,N ,
ΠA,0,ΠA,1,ΠB,0,ΠB,1)
where
• UA,j is a unitary operator onA⊗M for j = 1, . . . , N ,
• UB,j is a unitary operator onM⊗B for j = 1, . . . , N ,
• ΠA,0 and ΠA,1 are projections from A onto orthog-
onal subspaces of A (representing Alice’s final mea-
surements for outcome 0 and 1, respectively),
• ΠB,0 and ΠB,1 are projections from B onto orthogo-
nal subspaces of B (representing Bob’s final measure-
ments for outcome 0 and 1, respectively),
so that for
|ψN 〉 := (1A ⊗ UB,N )(UA,N ⊗ 1B)(1A ⊗ UB,N−1)
(UA,N−1 ⊗ 1B) · · · (1A ⊗ UB,1)(UA,1 ⊗ 1B)|0〉
holds
(ΠA,0 ⊗ 1M ⊗ 1B)|ψN 〉 = (1A ⊗ 1M ⊗ΠB,0)|ψN 〉
(26)
(ΠA,1 ⊗ 1M ⊗ 1B)|ψN 〉 = (1A ⊗ 1M ⊗ΠB,1)|ψN 〉
(27)
‖(ΠA,0 ⊗ 1M ⊗ 1B)|ψN 〉‖ = ‖(ΠA,1 ⊗ 1M ⊗ 1B)|ψN 〉‖
(28)
The first two conditions ensure that when Alice and Bob
are honest, they both get the same value for the coin and the
third condition guarantees that when Alice and Bob are hon-
est, their coin is not biased. A player aborts if her or his final
measurement does not produce outcome 0 or 1; of course, it
is no restriction to delay this action to the end of the proto-
col.
Lemma 9 Fix an arbitrary two-party quantum coin-flip-
ping protocol. Let p1∗ and p∗1 denote the probability that
Alice or Bob, respectively, can force the outcome of the pro-
tocol to be 1 if the other party follows the protocol. De-
note by p1 the probability for outcome 1 when there are no
cheaters. Then p1∗p∗1 ≥ p1.
Hence, if p1 = 12 , then max{p1∗, p∗1} ≥ 1√2 . To prove
Lemma 9, we construct the view of a run of the protocol
from an honest Alice’s point of view, with Bob wanting
to bias the protocol towards 1. The problem of optimizing
Bob’s strategy is a semidefinite program.
Lemma 10 The optimal strategy of Bob trying to force out-
come 1 is the solution to the following SDP over the semi-
definite matrices ρA,0, . . . , ρA,N operating on A⊗M:
maximize tr ((ΠA,1 ⊗ 1M)ρA,N) subject to (29)
trM(ρA,0) = |0〉〈0|A (30)
trM(ρA,j) = trM(UA,jρA,j−1U∗A,j) (1 ≤ j ≤ N) (31)
Proof. Alice starts with her private memory in state |0〉A
and we permit Bob to determine the M part of the initial
state. Therefore all Alice knows is that initially, the space
accessible to her is in state ρA,0 with trM(ρA,0) = |0〉〈0|A.
Alice sends the first message, transforming the state to
ρ′A,0 := UA,1ρA,0U
∗
A,1. Now Bob can do any unitary op-
eration on M⊗ B leading to ρA,1, so the only constraint
is trM(ρA,1) = trM(ρ′A,0). In the next round, honest Al-
ice applies UA,2, then Bob can do some operation that pre-
serves the partial trace, and so forth. The probability for Al-
ice outputting 1 is tr((ΠA,1 ⊗ 1M)ρA,N ) because the fi-
nal state for Alice is ρA,N and she performs an orthogo-
nal measurement on A with projections ΠA,0, ΠA,1, and
1A −ΠA,0 −ΠA,1 (which represents “abort”). ✷
Lemma 11 The dual SDP to the primal SDP in Lemma 10
is
minimize 〈0|ZA,0|0〉 subject to (32)
ZA,j ⊗ 1M ≥ U∗A,j+1(ZA,j+1 ⊗ 1M)UA,j+1 (33)
(for all j : 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1)
ZA,N = ΠA,1 (34)
over the Hermitian matrices ZA,0, . . . ZA,N operating on
A.
Proof. We form the dual of the SDP in Lemma 10 as fol-
lows: it is equivalent to maximizing over the ρA,j the mini-
mum of
tr((ΠA,1⊗1M)ρA,N )−tr(ZA,0(trM(ρA,0)−|0〉〈0|M))
−
N∑
j=1
tr(ZA,j trM(ρA,j − UA,jρA,j−1U∗A,j)) (35)
subject to the operators ZA,j on M being Hermitian (for
0 ≤ j ≤ N ). In the sum above, the terms containing ρA,j
for 0 ≤ j < N are
− tr(ZA,j trM(ρA,j))
+ tr(ZA,j+1 trM(UA,j+1ρA,jU∗A,j+1)) ,
which equals
tr
((−(ZA,j ⊗ 1M)+
U∗A,j+1(ZA,j+1 ⊗ 1M)UA,j+1
)
ρA,j
)
.
Since this term must be non-positive, we arrive at the in-
equality (33).
For j = N , we obtain the dual equality constraint (34)
and the dual objective function becomes the only summand
of (35) that does not involve any ρA,j . ✷
Proof of Lemma 9. Let ZA,j and ZB,j (0 ≤ j ≤ N ) de-
note the optimal solutions for the dual SDPs for a cheat-
ing Bob and a cheating Alice, respectively. For each j,
0 ≤ j ≤ N , let
|ψj〉 := (1A ⊗ UB,j)(UA,j ⊗ 1B) · · ·
(1A ⊗ UB,1)(UA,1 ⊗ 1B)|0〉
denote the state of the protocol in round j when both parties
are honest. Let Fj := 〈ψj |(ZA,j ⊗ 1M ⊗ ZB,j)|ψj〉. We
claim
p1∗p∗1 = F0 (36)
Fj ≥ Fj+1 (0 ≤ j < N) (37)
FN = p1. (38)
Combining (36)–(38), we obtain the desired p1∗p∗1 ≥ p1.
We now proceed to prove these claims.
Note that the primal SDP from Lemma 10 is strictly fea-
sible: Bob playing honestly yields a feasible solution that is
strictly positive. The strong-duality theorem of semidefinite
programming states that in this case, the optimal value of
the primal and the dual SDPs are the same, and therefore
p1∗ = 〈0|AZA,0|0〉A and p∗1 = 〈0|BZB,0|0〉B and
p1∗p∗1 = 〈0|AZA,0|0〉A · 〈0|M1M|0〉M · 〈0|BZB,0|0〉B
= 〈0|(ZA,0 ⊗ 1M ⊗ ZB,0)|0〉 = F0.
The inequalities (37) hold because of the constraints (33).
Equality (38) holds because by constraint (34) we have
〈ϕ|(ZA,N ⊗ 1M ⊗ ZB,N )|ϕ〉 =
‖(ΠA,1 ⊗ 1M ⊗ 1B)(1A ⊗ 1M ⊗ΠB,1)|ϕ〉‖2
for any |ϕ〉; |ψN 〉 is the final state of the protocol when both
players are honest, so by equation (27),
‖(ΠA,1 ⊗ 1M ⊗ 1B)(1A ⊗ 1M ⊗ΠB,1)|ψN 〉‖2
= ‖(ΠA,1 ⊗ 1M ⊗ 1B)|ψN 〉‖2 = p1.
✷
5.2. More than two parties
We will now extend Kitaev’s lower bound to k parties.
As with the upper bounds, we first start with a single honest
player (g = 1), and then extend the result further to any g.
Theorem 12 Any strong quantum coin-flipping protocol
for k parties has bias at least
1
2
− ln 2
k
−O
(
1
k2
)
if it has to deal with up to (k − 1) bad parties.
We consider the model of private pairwise quantum chan-
nels between the parties; by Theorem 5 the results immedi-
ately carry over to the quantum broadcast channel.
Definition 13 Let H := A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ak ⊗M denote the
Hilbert space composed of the private spaces of k parties
and the message space. An N -round k-party coin-flipping
protocol is a tuple
(i1, . . . , iN , U1, . . . , UN ,Π1,0,Π1,1, . . . ,Πk,0,Πk,1)
where
• ij with 1 ≤ ij ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ N , indicates whose turn
it is to access the message space in round j,
• Uj is a unitary operator onAij⊗M for j = 1, . . . , N ,
• for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Πi,0 and Πi,1 are projections from Ai
to orthogonal subspaces of Ai (representing the mea-
surement that party i performs to determine outcome 0
or 1, respectively),
so that for |ψN 〉 := U˜iN · · · U˜i1 |0〉 and each pair 1 ≤ i <
i′ ≤ k and any b ∈ {0, 1} holds
Π˜i,b|ψN 〉 = Π˜i′,b|ψN 〉 (39)
‖Π˜i,b|ψN 〉‖ = ‖Π˜i,1−b|ψN 〉‖. (40)
Here U˜j denotes the extension of Uj to all of H that acts
as identity on the tensor factors Ai′ for i′ 6= ij; Π˜i,b :=
(1A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1Ai−1 ⊗Πi,b ⊗ 1Ai+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1Ak) is the ex-
tension of Πi,b to H.
Lemma 14 Fix an arbitrary quantum coin flipping proto-
col. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let pb be the probability of outcome b
in case all players are honest. Let pi,b denote the probabil-
ity that party i can be convinced by the other parties that
the outcome of the protocol is b ∈ {0, 1}. Then
p1,b · . . . · pk,b ≥ pb
Proof of Lemma 14. The optimal strategy for k − 1 bad
players trying to force outcome 1 is the solution to the SDP
from Lemma 10 where all the cheating players are merged
into a single cheating player.
Let (Zi,j)0≤j≤N denote the optimal solution for the dual
SDP for good player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. For each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ N ,
let |ψj〉 := U˜j · · · U˜1|0〉 denote the state of the protocol in
round j when all parties are honest. Let Fj := 〈ψj |(Z1,j ⊗
· · ·⊗Zk,j⊗1M)|ψj〉. By a similar argument as in the proof
of Lemma 9, we have
p1,1 · . . . · pk,1 = F0 (41)
Fj ≥ Fj+1 (0 ≤ j < N) (42)
FN = p1 (43)
Hence, p1,1 · . . . · pk,1 ≥ p1. Repeating the argument with
the cheaters aiming for outcome 0 completes the proof. ✷
Theorem 12 is an immediate consequence.
Proof of Theorem 12. Using the notation of Lemma 14,
we have p0 = 12 . Let q = maxi pi,0 denote the maximum
probability of any player forcing output 0. By Lemma 14,
qk ≥ p1,0 · . . . · pk,0 ≥ 12 , from which follows that
q ≥
(
1
2
)1/k
≥ 1− ln 2
k
−O
(
1
k2
)
.
By Theorem 5 this result applies both to private pairwise
quantum channels and the quantum broadcast channel. ✷
Extending to many honest players. Extension to any num-
ber of honest players follows almost immediately from The-
orem 12. Indeed, take any protocol Π for k parties tolerat-
ing (k − g) cheaters. Arbitrarily partition our players into
k′ = kg groups and view each each as one “combined
player.” We get an induced protocol Π′ with k′ “super-
players” which achieves at least the same bias ε as Π, and
can tolerate up to (k′ − 1) bad players. By Theorem 12,
ε ≥ 1
2
−O( 1k′ ) = 12 −O( gk ).
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